In this paper, we propose a definition of goal achievability: given a basic action theory describing an initial state of the world and some primitive actions available to a robot, including some actions which return binary sensing information, what goals can be achieved by the robot? The main technical result of the paper is a proof that a simple robot programming language is universal, in that any effectively achievable goal can be achieved by getting the robot to execute one of the robot programs. The significance of this result is at least two fold. First, it is in many ways similar to the equivalence theorem between Turing machines and recursive functions, but applied to robots whose actions are specified by an action theory. Secondly, it provides formal justifications for using the simple robot programming language as a foundation for our work on robotics.
Introduction
Imagine that in the not too distant future, you are given a robot of some sort, and that you want to figure out what it can do. Browsing through the manual that came with it, you discover that the robot is capable of performing under computer control any of a set of primitive actions a 1 ; ..., a n : According to the manual, what each action a i actually does depends on the state of the environment. First, to complete successfully, a precondition of the action must hold in the environment. Next, assuming the action is successful, its effect on the environment may also depend on certain other conditions. Finally, some of the actions are connected to sensors and can return a binary value indicating when a certain condition holds. The question is: assuming we are willing to do some programming, what do we expect to be able to achieve with the robot?
In this paper, we propose an answer to this question. Specifically, we propose an abstract characterization of what goals are effectively achievable as a function of a given logical theory describing the initial state of the world and the primitive actions available to the robot. The main contribution of the paper is a precise technical framework where questions of goal achievability can be posed and answered. The main technical result is a proof of the universality of the simple robot programming language introduced in [8] : it will turn out that a goal is effectively achievable according to logical theory T iff there is a robot program that achieves it according to T.
A motivating example
To make the problem more concrete, imagine that you are also given a solid steel box that contains a treasure. There is a small robot-sized door on the box, which is currently closed, and there are two buttons beside it, a green one and a red one. The primitive actions available to the robot are pressGreen, pressRed, and fetch. The manual says that if the robot happens to be beside the closed door, pressGreen causes the green button to be pressed, and pressRed similarly. The manual also says that the robot has a heat sensor so that a press action returns 1 when the button pressed was hot, and 0 otherwise. The fetch action causes the robot to trundle inside the box and retrieve what's inside, provided that the robot is beside the door and the door is open. 1 The goal we are interested in here, obviously, is getting the treasure, under assumptions like the following:
1. If we know nothing else about the environment, we want our account of achievability to predict that we cannot achieve the goal. Of course, we might end up eventually getting the treasure by forcing the door open with a crowbar, or by saying some magic words, or even by getting the robot to press the buttons in some order. But there is no reason to believe a priori that any of these methods will work.
2. If we know that the red button opens the door of the box, we want our account of achievability to say that we can achieve the goal using the robot: we get it to do the sequence pressRed, then fetch. Of course, something might go wrong: the door might jam, lightning might strike the robot, a comet might hit the earth. But there is no reason to believe that the sequence will fail given what we have been told.
3. If we know that one of the buttons opens the door of the box, and the other button locks the door permanently, but we don't know which is which, our account should predict that we cannot achieve the goal using the robot. As in (2), we know that there is a sequence of actions that will work -press one of the buttons then fetch -but here we do not know what that sequence is.
4. But consider the following situation: we know that the door can be opened by first pressing the green button, and then pressing one more button, but we are not told which, and again, getting it wrong locks the door permanently. However, suppose that we know that the safe will lock forever iff the robot pushes a button that felt hot on the previous press. As in (3), we know that there is a sequence of actions that will work, and again we cannot say what that sequence is. This time, however, our account should predict that we can achieve the goal: we get the robot to pressGreen, and then pressGreen once more if the button was cold, but pressRed if it was hot.
5. Finally, suppose we know that after pressing the green button some unspecified number of times and at least once, pressing the red button will open the door and pressing the green one will lock it forever. With no other information, we clearly cannot obtain the treasure. However, if we also know as in (4) that the door will lock forever iff the robot presses a button that was just hot, then we can once again achieve the goal: we get the robot to repeatedly press the green button until it feels hot, then press the red one to open the door, and then fetch the treasure.
To the best of our knowledge, there is as yet no formal framework that would give the intuitively correct answers for examples like these.
Relation to other work
There are, however, three areas of research that come close to providing these answers. Planning As the five examples above illustrate, the idea of a goal being achievable by a robot is clearly related to the concept of planning and especially, given the sensing, conditional planning, as in [2, 9, 13, 16] . In all of the variants above, we ended up saying that the treasure was obtainable precisely when we could formulate some sort of plan to obtain it. Why then not simply define goal achievability in terms of the existence of a plan?
The problem with this involves characterizing exactly what we mean by a plan. An obvious case is when a fixed sequence of actions is sufficient. But in some of the variants above, we needed to consider conditional and iterative plans, which suggests a structure more like that of a program [10] . Clearly these would not be programs in a traditional language like C or LISP. For one thing, the primitive statements of the program would have to involve the actions a i , rather than the usual variable assignment or read/write statements. What would we use as the conditions in an if-then-else or a while-loop statement? How should the execution of programs containing the a i be defined?
We believe that these questions can be resolved and that it is possible to characterize achievability in terms of such programs (see Section 4 below) . However, to avoid making design decisions that might initially appear to be arbitrary or restrictive, we prefer to first define achievability in a general program-independent way, and then prove that a programming language is adequate according to this definition.
Computability A second concept related to achievability is that of effective computability [12] . As will become clear, we will end up defining achievable goals as those where what to do next to achieve them, given what is known about the actions and the initial state of the world, can be "computed" as a function of what the sensors tell the robot.
However, we cannot simply use an existing account of computability for two reasons. First, we want to allow for incomplete information about the environment surrounding the robot. In contrast to typical accounts of computability, the initial state of the environment need only be partially specified by a collection of axioms. The second reason concerns the primitive actions. In typical computability models, the available actions are predefined and internal to the machine (or formalism). For instance, we might have actions to write and read a Turing machine tape, or to increment and decrement registers, or to assign values to variables, and so on. In our case, by contrast, the primitive actions for a robot are not predefined and are external, in that they have effects in the environment outside of the robot. These actions are also described by a collection of axioms, which specify the action preconditions and effects, and deal with the frame problem.
Thus our account of goal achievability depends crucially on what the given axioms say about the initial state and the available actions. In some of the examples above, we had two theories T 1 T 2 describing the same initial state and set of actions. A goal was considered unachievable relative to the information provided by T 1 , but achievable relative to T 2 where additional information was available. We would like to define a notion of goal achievability as a relation between a formal theory T and the goals we would like to achieve, and no existing account of computability does this.
Knowing how Finally, the concept of achievability is very closely related to the concept of an agent knowing how (or being able to) achieve a goal or execute a plan, as discussed for example, in [1, 17, 18] . One difference between the two concepts concerns the issue of effectiveness. As far as we know, no existing account of knowing how or ability considers whether or not the know how of an agent would be effective, in the sense of allowing the agent to "compute" what to do. But putting effectiveness aside, there is also a difference in point of view: who has to know what and when. There may be conditions that we would consider to be achievable, but that the agent does not know how to bring about. For example, if the red button opens the door, we know that goal of getting the treasure is achievable by the agent/robot; but if the agent does not know which button is the correct one, we would not say that it knew how to get the treasure. Conversely, we can imagine a situation where we do not consider the goal to be achievable (in the sense of being able to produce a plan) because we do not know which buttons to use, but where we know that the agent does. We can also imagine situations where the agent initially knows less than we do, but after obtaining information from its sensors, knows as much or more than we do.
When reasoning about what one agent knows about another, the concept of knowinghow or ability may be the more useful one; when attempting to analyze what we can get an agent or robot to do for us, our notion of goal achievability may be the more appropriate. Moreover, it ought to be the case that the two notions coincide when the agent knows exactly what we do about the environment and the actions. The precise relation between the two concepts is subtle, however, and we will not explore it further here (see [6] ).
In sum, while the concept of goal achievability is clearly related to the areas of planning, computability, and agent ability, none of these can give us the answers we want, for example, in the five situations above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the situation calculus, a formal logical language in terms of which the state of the environment and the primitive actions can be described by a collection of axioms we call a basic action theory. In Section 3, we define precisely what we mean by effective achievability (and related notions) as a function of a given basic action theory. In Section 4, we review the syntax and semantics of a simple robot programming language first proposed in [8] as a language for plans. In Section 5, we present some results, including the main technical result of the paper: the universality of the robot programming language. This is a robot analogue of the classic universality result in computability theory: a function is computable iff there is a program/machine that computes it. Finally, in Section 6, we summarize the paper and suggest topics for further research.
The situation calculus and basic action theories
Since the goal of this research is to make the specification of goal achievability depend on a given action theory T describing the initial state of the world and the available actions, we need to describe the representation language we use to formulate the theories, which is a dialect of the situation calculus [11] .
The language of the situation calculus is many-sorted. Normally, there is a sort for situations, a sort for actions, and a sort for objects like blocks and people that are elements in the domain of interest. We assume that there is a special constant S 0 used to denote the initial situation, namely that situation in which no actions have yet occurred; there is a distinguished binary function symbol do where do(a; s) denotes the successor situation to s resulting from performing the action a; relations whose truth values vary from situation to situation, are called (relational) fluents, and are denoted by predicate symbols taking a situation term as their last argument; there is a special predicate Poss(a; s) used to state that action a is executable in situation s; and finally, there is a special predicate SF(a; s) used to state that the sensor associated with action a (if any) returns the value 1 in situation s: 2
Within this language, we can formulate domain theories which describe the initial state of the world and the actions available to the robot. We specify the preconditions of actions, for example, by writing axioms that define Poss; we specify the condition measured by a sensor by writing axioms that define SF; and so on. Here, we use a theory which contains only the following axioms:
Axioms describing the initial situation, S 0 . Syntactically, these axioms cannot mention any other situation terms except S 0 . Action precondition axioms, one for each primitive action A, characterizing Poss(A; s). Foundational, domain independent axioms that characterize the structure of the space of situations, and define a predicate so that s 1 s 2 holds iff there are actions a 1 ; : : : ; a n , 0 n, such that s 2 = do( a 1 ; : : : ; a n ]; s 1 )^Poss(a 1 ; s 1 )^: : :^Poss(a n ; do( a 1 ; : : : ; a n?1 ]; s 1 )) holds, where for any situation s, do( ]; s) = s, and inductively, do( ajL]; s) = do(L; do(a; s)). Notice the similarity between these axioms and Peano Arithmetic. The first two axioms are unique names assumptions; they eliminate finite cycles, and merging. The third axiom is second-order induction; it amounts to a domain closure axiom which says that every situation must be obtained by repeatedly applying do to S 0 . 3 The last two axioms define < inductively.
Following [4] , we call a theory of this form a basic action theory.
Effective achievability
To define in its most general form what a robot armed with primitive actions a 1 , ...a n ; can achieve, it is useful to begin by looking at the problem from the point of view of a robot controller, for instance, an onboard computer.
What a robot controller needs to do at any given point in time is to select the primitive action to perform next (or to stop). We are willing to assume arbitrary amounts of computation and intelligence in making this decision, as well as full access to the given basic action theory. We do not want to assume, however, that the controller necessarily knows everything there is to know about the current state of the environment. For example, if it is part of the basic action theory that a door is open initially, the controller can use this fact; but if the action theory does not specify the state of the door, the robot may need to perform some (sensing) action to find out whether it is open, assuming such an action is available.
So what does a robot controller have access to beyond the given basic action theory? In its most general form, we might imagine that the robot controller remembers all of the actions it has selected until now, as well as the sensing results of all these actions. In general, these sensing results must be compatible with the given action theory, but will not be entailed by it, and so provide additional information to the controller.
Once we have specified what a robot controller is, we can then define the achievable goals. Roughly, a goal will be considered to be achievable if there exists a robot controller such that if we were to repeatedly do the primitive action it prescribes, then no matter how the sensing turns out, we would eventually terminate in a situation where, according to the action theory, the goal condition would hold. We now proceed to formally define the relevant notions.
Robot Controllers and Environments
We assume a finite set A of actions that are parameterless, and represented by constant symbols. At any point, the robot will be in some state determined by the actions it has performed so far and, in the event of sensing, the readings of its sensors. More precisely, we define: Definition 1 (History) A history is an element of the set R = (A f0;1g) .
Intuitively, the history ( 1 ; 1 ) ( n ; n ) means that 1 ; :::; n is the sequence of actions performed so far, and 1 ; :::; n are the respective sensing results of the actions: For any i, if the sensing fluent SF holds for i in the situation where the action is performed, then i = 1, else i = 0. Notice that by the form of basic action theories (cf. section 2), if i is an action that has nothing to do with sensors, then i = 1. Notice also that the empty sequence is a history. A robot controller is then a mapping from such a history to the next action to perform.
In addition to the given primitive actions in A, we assume some special symbols. It should be clear that the only feedback the robot gets from the environment is through its sensors. Just as a robot controller specifies the next action to perform, an environment specifies the sensing result of that action. More precisely, we define:
Definition 4 (Environment)
An environment E is any function from histories and actions to the set f0;1g, E : R A ) f0;1g. In other words, E( ; ) tells us what the sensor associated with action will report given the history :
Intuitively, the picture is this. We start with the empty history ; the robot controller C chooses an action to perform 1 = C( ); the environment E determines the value returned by the 1 sensor: 1 = E( ; 1 ); given this result, the robot then chooses another action to perform 2 = C(( 1 ; 1 )); and the environment determines the 2 sensor value: 2 = E(( 1 ; 1 ); 2 ); then 3 = C(( 1 ; 1 ) ( 2 ; 2 )) and so on, until C says stop: Definition 5 (System) A system is a pair (C; E), where C is a controller, and E an environment.
Frequently, we shall refer to the system (C; E) as the controller C under the environment E. Definition 6 ((Terminating) run) A history is a run of a system (C; E) if, inductively, either is the empty sequence or = 0 ( ; ) such that 0 is a run of the system, C( 0 ) = 2 A, and E( 0 ; ) = . A history is a terminating run of (C; E) if it is a run of (C; E) and C( ) = stop.
Clearly, a system can have at most one terminating run. 4 The reason we need abort and ? will be made clear later in the context of robot programs.
Achievability and Effective Achievability
Note that neither controllers nor environments are part of the situation calculus; they are simply abstract functions over the domain of histories. To make a connection with the situation calculus, we first relate histories to situations: Definition 7 (Run and situation) Given any history , and any situation term s, we define another situation term, the end situation of on s, written end( ; s), as: end( ; s) = s; and inductively, if = 0 ( ; ), then end( ; s) = do( ; end( 0 ; s)).
Next, we relate environments to logical interpretations of a basic action theory.
Definition 8 (Environment and interpretation)
Given an interpretation I and a ground situation term S, an environment E is said to be determined by I at S iff for any history , and any action , E( ; ) = 1 iff I j = SF( ; end( ; S)).
It is clear that there is exactly one such environment for any given I and S. In other words, once we specify an interpretation of a basic action theory (and a starting situation), the interpretation of the SF predicate completely determines how the sensing will turn out, and hence the environment.
In general, we expect a basic action theory to be satisfied by many interpretations, corresponding to the various ways the environment could turn out. Goal achievability requires a controller to work in all such interpretations: Definition 9 ((Effective) achievability) Given an action theory T, a goal G(s) which is a formula with a single free situation variable s, and a ground situation term S, we say that G is (effectively) achievable in S according to T iff there is an (effective) controller C such that for any model I of T, there is a terminating run of C under the environment determined by I at S such that I j = S end( ; S)^G(end( ; S)):
In general, there will be goals that are achievable but not effectively achievable. However, as we are going to show below, for context-free action theories, if a goal is achievable, then it is also effectively achievable.
Achievability in Context-Free Action Theories
By a context-free action theory we mean a theory in which all actions are context free in the sense that their effects are independent of the state in which they are executed. For example, in the blocks world, the action stack(x; y), that picks up block x on the table and puts in on top of block y, is context free -as long as it is executable, it will always cause x to be on y.
On the other hand, in the extended blocks world in which there may be more than one block on top of another block, the action unstack(x; y), that removes x from y, is not context free -whether block y will be clear afterwards, for example, depends on whether x was the only block on top of y. 
the axiom (1) implies that for any action a, after the action is performed, F will be true (added) for tuples in fx j + F (x; a)g, false (deleted) for tuples in fx j ?
F (x; a)g, and persist
for tuples in fxj: + F (x; a)^: ? F (x; a)g. The action a is context-free because the conditions ? F and + F are situation independent. Note that in the usual formulation of STRIPS, with add and delete lists, every action is considered to be context-free.
Theorem 1 Let T be a context-free action theory, and the consistency condition (2) holds for every fluent F. 5 If a goal G is achievable in S, then it is also effectively achievable.
Proof: See Appendix A. Informally, the theorem holds because a context free action theory can only have finite number of possible legal states. One can read the theorem in two ways. On the one hand, it points to some potential computational advantages of working with context-free action theories. On the other hand, it also points out their expressive limitations. For example, this theorem implies that it is impossible to simulate an arbitrary context-sensitive action with a finite set of context free actions.
A robot program language
In [8] , the following question was considered: what should the output of a planning procedure be? In the absence of sensing, the answer is reasonably clear and dates back to Green [3] : a plan is a legally executable sequence of actions that results in a final situation where the goal condition holds. In the presence of sensing, however, a planner cannot simply return a sequence of actions since the actions to execute to satisfy the goal could depend on the runtime result of earlier sensing operations (as in the examples in the introduction).
Clearly, what is needed is something more like a program, with branches and loops. On the other hand, it would need to be a program that is not only legally executable (in the sense that the preconditions of the primitive actions at each step are satisfied), and leads to a goal state (in the sense that the program terminates and the goal condition holds in the terminating situation), but also a program that does not require more information to execute than what we expect the robot to have. For example, if all we know is that the door to the steel box opens by pushing either the red or the green button, then the program which says something like "if the red button is the one that opens the door then push it, else push the other one" might satisfy the first two conditions, but not the last one.
There are various ways to ensure this last requirement. The approach taken in [8] is to invent a simple language that contains branches and loops, but that does not mention any conditions involving fluents. The resulting programs are then trivial to execute since without such conditions, there is nothing for the robot executing the programs to know.
Consider the following simple programming language, defined as the least set of terms satisfying the following:
1. nil and exit are programs; 2. If a is an action and r 1 and r 2 are programs, then branch(a; r 1 ; r 2 ) is a program; 3. If r 1 and r 2 are programs, then loop(r 1 ; r 2 ) is a program.
We will call such terms robot programs and the resulting set of terms R, the robot programming language.
Informally, these programs are executed by an agent as follows: to execute nil the agent does nothing; to execute exit it must be executing a loop, in which case see below; to execute branch(a; r 1 ; r 2 ) it first executes primitive action a, and then it executes r 1 if the sensor associated with a returns 1, and r 2 otherwise; to execute loop(r 1 ; r 2 ), it executes the body r 1 , and if it ends with nil, it repeats r 1 again, and continues doing so until it ends with exit, in which case it finishes by executing r 2 :
Note that many actions will not have an associated sensor and will always return 1. We thus use the abbreviation seq(a; r) for branch(a; r; r) for those cases where the returned value is ignored.
Here are some robot programs for the examples in the introduction. (Recall that the pressGreen action returns 1 if the button is hot).
Sequence of actions:
seq(pressRed, seq(fetch, nil)).
Conditional plan: branch(pressGreen, seq(pressRed, seq(fetch, nil)), seq(pressGreen, seq(fetch, nil))).

Iterative plan: loop( branch(pressGreen, exit, nil), seq(pressRed, seq(fetch, nil))).
Intuitively at least, the following should be clear:
An agent can always be assumed to know how to execute a robot program. These programs are completely deterministic, and do not mention any fluents. Assuming the binary sensing actions return a single bit of information to the agent, there is nothing else it should need to know.
The example robot programs above, when executed, result in final situations where the goal conditions from the introduction are satisfied.
To be precise about this, we need to first define what situation is the final one resulting from executing a robot program r in an initial situation s. 
where the ellipsis is (the conjunction of the universal closure of) the following:
1. Termination, normal case: P(nil; s; s; 1); 2. Termination, loop body: P(exit; s; s; 0);
Primitive actions returning 1:
Poss(a; s)^SF(a; s)^P(r 0 ; do(a; s); s 0 ; x) P(branch(a; r 0 ; r 00 ); s; s 0 ; x);
Primitive actions returning 0:
Poss(a; s)^:SF(a; s)^P(r 00 ; do(a; s); s 0 ; x) P(branch(a; r 0 ; r 00 ); s; s 0 ; x);
Loops, exit case:
P(r 0 ; s; s 00 ; 0)^P (r 00 ; s 00 ; s 0 ; x) P(loop(r 0 ; r 00 ); s; s 0 ; x);
6. Loops, repeat case: P(r 0 ; s; s 00 ; 1)^P (loop(r 0 ; r 00 ); s 00 ; s 0 ; x) P(loop(r 0 ; r 00 ); s; s 0 ; x):
By using second-order quantification in this way, we are defining Rdo recursively as the least predicate P satisfying the constraints in the ellipsis. Second-order logic is necessary here since there is no way to characterize the transitive closure implicit in unbounded iteration in first-order terms.
The relation P(r; s; s 0 ; 0) in this definition is intended to hold when executing r starting in s terminates legally at s 0 with exit; P(r; s; s 0 ; 1) is the same but terminating with nil. The difference shows up when executing loop(r; r 0 ): in the former case, we exit the loop and continue with r 0 ; in the latter, we continue the iteration by repeating loop(r; r 0 ) once more.
With this definition in place, we can now characterize precisely the goals that are achievable using robot programs:
Given an action theory T, a robot program r, a goal condition G(s) and a ground situation term S, we say that r achieves G in S according to T iff T j = 9s 0 :Rdo(r; S; s 0 )^G(s 0 )
We now relate this definition to effective achievability.
Robot programs are universal
Our main technical result in this paper is that a goal is achievable by an (augmented) robot program iff it is achievable by an effective controller. We shall prove this in two parts. First, we show that for any robot program, there is a corresponding effective controller for it . We then show that if 5 special "Turing machine actions" are included, then any effective controller can be simulated by a robot program. 
From robot programs to effective controllers
From effective controllers to robot programs
Given an effective controller, there may not always be a robot program that simulates it. 6
The easiest way to remedy this is to add some special Turing machine actions as in [8] .
Formally, we assume that in addition to the actions in A, Proof: See Appendix C.
The main theorem
By Theorem 2 and 3, we have the following result: Proof: Suppose G is achieved by the effective controller C. We show that the robot program r for C as in Theorem 3 achieves G. Suppose I is any model of T. Then, by the definition of achievability, there is a terminating run of (C; E) such that I j = S end( ; S)Ĝ (end( ; S)), where E is the environment determined by I and S. According to Theorem 3, there is a situation S 00 such that clean(S 00 ) = end( ; S) and I j = S end( ; S) Rdo(r; S; S 00 ). Thus I j = Rdo(r; S; S 00 ). By I j = G(end( ; S)) and clean(S 00 ) = end( ; S), we have I j = G(S 00 ) (by a property about clean). So I j = (9s 0 )Rdo(r; S; s 0 )^G(s 0 ). Therefore T j = (9s 0 )Rdo(r; S; s 0 )^G(s 0 ), and so r achieves G:
Conversely, suppose r achieves G in S. We show that the effective controller C for r as in Theorem 2 achieves G in S, i.e. for any model I of T, there is a terminating run of the system (C; E) such that I j = S end( ; S)^G(end( ; S)), where E is the environment determined by I and S. Now suppose I is a model of T, by the assumption that r achieves G, i.e. T j = (9s 0 )Rdo(r; S; s 0 )^G(s 0 ); there is a ground situation term S 0 such that I j = Rdo(r; S; S 0 )^G(S 0 ). By Theorem 2, there is a terminating run of (C; E) such that S 0 = end( ; S): So I j = Rdo(r; S; end( ; S))^G(end( ; S)). But by the definition of Rdo, we have j = (8s 1 ; s 2 )Rdo(r; s 1 ; s 2 ) s 1 s 2 . Thus we have I j = S end( ; S). This shows that G is achieved by the controller C.
Conclusion
We have provided a definition of what it might mean for a condition to be achievable by a robot relative to a given action theory which describes the initial state of the world and the primitive actions available to the robot. Our main technical contribution is in showing that this notion of effective achievability coincides with a notion of achievability by a simple class of robot programs independently introduced in [8] . The significance of this result is at least two fold. First, it is in many ways similar to the equivalence theorem between Turing machines and recursive functions, but applied to robots whose actions are specified by an action theory. Secondly, it provides formal justifications for using the simple class of robot programs as a foundation for our work on robotics. For instance, [8] uses this class of robot programs as a basis for robot planning. We are also beginning work on compiling high-level GOLOG programs [7] into this class of robot programs.
There are some limitations with our current model that are worth mentioning here. First of all, we have assumed that there are only a finite number of parameterless actions. We have also assumed that the sensing actions are binary, characterized by the special SF predicate. Furthermore, we have assumed that the only feedback from the environment is the result of these sensing actions. In particular, we have not concerned ourselves here with possible action failure or exogenous actions. Some of these assumptions, such as the binary nature of sensing, are easy to relax; others will require more effort.
In concluding, we want to mention that we are working on relating this work to our other work on agent ability and knowing-how [6] . Another direction worth pursuing is investigating the "finite automaton" version of achievability, i.e. the power of robot programs without the special Turing machine actions.
Appendix A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 Let T be a context-free action theory, and the consistency condition (2) holds for every fluent F. If a goal G is achievable in S, then it is also effectively achievable.
We first prove a lemma which says that the set of legal states in a context-free action theory is finite. To formulate the lemma, we first introduce a few notations. Let F 1 (x 1 ; s); ; F n (x n ; s) be all the fluents in the language. We define SameState(s; s 0 ), meaning that s and s 0 yield the same state, as follows:
SameState(s; s 0 ) def = (8x 1 )(F 1 (x 1 ; s) F 1 (x 1 ; s 0 ))^ ^(8x n )(F n (x n ; s) F n (x n ; s 0 )):
The following are some simple properties about SameState: Since the fluent F is arbitrary, the finiteness of the set in question follows.
Proof of Theorem 1 Suppose G is achievable in S according to T. We need to show that there is a recursive controller that achieves G in S according to T. In fact, we can do better. We'll show that there is a finite controller that achieves G. Let is clearly well (uniquely) defined, and achieves G in S as well. Furthermore, if S is finite, then C 0 is finite, thus recursive. We now show that S is indeed finite.
Observe, however, that even though there are only finitely many states, we cannot bound the length of a run by removing "loops" starting and ending in the same state (and guarantee the finiteness of S this way). This is because a controller may be using pure sensing actions which do not change the state to obtain information. So we need a slightly more complex approach. Given a set of histories H, and a history 2 H, a segment in : = 1 2 for some 1 and 2 , is said to be determinate if for any 0 in H, whenever 1 is a proper prefix of 0 , then 1 is a prefix of 0 . In other words, the underlying controller determined by H according to (4) with S replaced by H, if any, does not need to consider the alternative outcome of the actions in . Notice that the empty sequence is trivially a determinate segment of any history with respect to any 1 and 2 above.
Given any run 2 S, we can decompose it into T j = S end( j?1 j ; S) SameState(end( i?1 i ; S); end( j?1 j ; S)): (6) We claim that j ( j ; j ) would have to be a determinate segment of , a contradiction with the assumptions that we made about equation (5) . To show that j ( j ; j )
is a determinate segment of , suppose 0 2 S, and j?1 is a proper prefix of 0 . Then j?1 j must be a prefix of 0 for j is a determinate segment of . Because both 0 and are terminating runs of the controller C, for some , j?1 j ( j ; ?(r 2 ; 00 ) if for some n 0; = 1 n 0 00 such that ?(r 1 ; i ) = stop for 1 i n; and ?(r 1 ; 0 ) = abort: ?(r 1 ; 0 ) otherwise, where 0 is a history such that for some n 0; = 1 n 0 ; ?(r 1 ; i ) = stop for 1 i n; and there is no proper prefix 00 of 0 such that ?(r 1 ; 00 ) = stop Clearly, for any program r, ?(r; ) is a recursive function. We now show that ?(r; ) satisfies the two conditions in the Theorem. We do so by induction over the structure of programs.
r is nil. For any ground situation term S, and any interpretation I: I j = (8s)(Rdo(nil; S; s) s = S)^:(9s)Rexit(nil; S; s):
From this, and the definition of ?(nil; ), the two conditions in the theorem are trivially satisfied.
r is exit. This case is analogous to the case of nil: For any S, and any I, I j = (8s)(Rexit(exit; S; s) s = S)^:(9s)Rdo(exit; S; s): r is branch(a; r 1 ; r 2 ). Inductively, we assume that the two conditions are satisfied for ?(r 1 ; ) and ?(r 2 ; ). Let S be an arbitrary ground situation term, and I an arbitrary interpretation.
Suppose I j = Rdo(branch(a; r 1 ; r 2 ); S; S 0 ). By the definition of Rdo, there are two cases:
1. I j = SF(a; S)^Rdo(r 1 ; do(a; S); S 0 ). By inductive assumption, there is a terminating run of ?(r 1 ; ) under the environment determined by I at do(a; S) such that S 0 = end ( ; do(a; S) ). By our construction of ?(branch(a; r 1 ; r 2 ); ), (a; 1) is a terminating run of ?(branch(a; r 1 ; r 2 ); ) under the environment determined by I at S. 7 Furthermore, end((a; 1) ; S) = end( ; do(a; S)) = S 0 :
2. I j = :SF(a;S)^Rdo(r 2 ; do(a; S); S 0 ). analogous to the previous case.
This proves condition (1)(a) of the theorem. The proof of (1)(b) is analogous.
To prove (2)(a), suppose is a terminating run of ?(branch(a; r 1 ; r 2 ); ) under the environment E determined by I at S. r is loop(r 1 ; r 2 ). The proof for this case is exactly like that for the branch case, but using Lemma 6.3.
The robot program home is such that whenever the tape encodes some history like: 00 1 1 n n ;
home will reset loc to 1: To paraphrase, the robot program r, starting at some home position on the tape, first writes 0011 encoding the empty history, and then returns to the home position. Next, within a loop, it repeatedly uses r M to place a suitable at the end of the history, and then interprets this : if it is 00 it goes into an infinite loop; if it is 11 it exits the loop (and so terminates);
if it is 10, it performs action A, writes either 0111 or 1011 on the tape depending on the sensing result returned, and then returns to the home position; if it is 01, it does the same as above but for action B. Note that when is 01 or 10, the effect of writing 0111 or 1011 on the tape depending on the result of action A or B ensures that the tape now encodes an extended history 00 1 1 n n n+1 n+1 11;
which is then ready for the next iteration. It can be verified that from this construction, the conditions in the theorem follow.
